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Abstract Tol (2003) questioned the applicability of expected cost-benefit analysis to global
mitigation policy when he found evidence that the uncertainty surrounding estimates of the
marginal damage of climate change could be infinite even if total damages were finite.
Yohe (2003) suggested that this problem could be alleviated if international development
aid were directed at eliminating the source of the problem – climate induced negative
growth rates in a few regions along a handful of troublesome scenarios. The hypothesis
about adding a second policy lever to the climate policy calculus is shown to hold, though
perhaps not as robustly as originally thought. A portfolio of international policies with at
least two independent tools can avoid infinite uncertainty on the margins and the associated
implications for global mitigation policy at a reasonable price even in the relatively unlikely
event that climate change causes negative economic growth in a region or two.
1 Introduction
The determination of appropriate climate policy is controversial because it is driven, at least
in part, by the choice of a decision-making framework. This choice, in turn, depends on
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alternative views of not only how the world should work, but also how it actually does
work. Two alternative approaches dominate the discussion. The first is based on (expected)
cost-benefit analysis. Broadly defined, this approach can include risk management
techniques by which the negative influences of variance in state variables can be
accommodated within the decision-making criteria; see, for example, Yohe et al. (2004).
The second defines tolerable windows of climate change. It is a variant of safe minimum
standards which function as thresholds for impacts that are to be avoided almost at any cost;
see, for example Bruckner et al. (2003) and Tol and Yohe (2006).
As argued in Pratt et al. (1995), however, it is axiomatic that cost-benefit analysis can be
applied to a policy decision only when uncertainty about net benefits is finite.1 If this
condition cannot be satisfied, then cost-benefit analysis is completely invalid and the
decision-maker should turn to perspectives designed to minimize the maximum regret
assigned across a wide range of plausible futures. The decision-maker, in other words,
should ask analysts to determine safe minimum standards or windows of tolerable impacts.
It follows, therefore, that the discussion on how to approach the climate policy debate turns
in large measure on the size of the uncertainty.
Tol (2003) used the FUND integrated assessment model to explore the range of
uncertainty in estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions, a crucial
input into any expected cost-benefit analysis of greenhouse gas emissions control. He found
evidence that this uncertainty could become infinite even if total damages were, themselves,
finite. His reasoning contemplated a philosopher-queen who would take account of how
climate change impacts all people. Indeed, she would design her climate policy on the basis
of monetised impacts that were aggregated across the globe using equity-weights that
explicitly recognized the fact that an extra dollar of income would be worth more to a poor
man than it would be to a rich man. She was, as well, aware that economic growth could be
reversed in some countries under some not-implausible specifications of climate change and
associated damages. As a result, she assigned these countries negative consumption
discount rates and high equity-weights in her aggregation scheme so that these extreme
scenarios ultimately overwhelmed the expected value of the marginal damage costs, its
standard deviation, and her calculation of the optimal policy. Without equity weights, she
could ignore the low dollar value of climate change damages to the world’s poorest
countries in her global calculus; but with equity weights, negative economic growth rates
would define impacts thresholds that would serve, for all intents and purposes, as binding
boundaries of tolerable climate change. See Azar and Lindgren (2003) and Howarth (2003)
for further commentary.
Yohe (2003) responded to Tol’s reasoning by arguing that global policy makers, or Tol’s
philosopher-queen for that matter, would not be restricted to one policy lever (mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions) in these circumstances. He hypothesized, in fact, that the global
community would find it in its own best interest to offer economic aid to poor countries. If
this aid prevented negative economic growth in some countries, then they could impose less
stringent climate policy upon themselves. The problem highlighted by Tol was, in his eyes,
simply a problem of trying to confront two policy objectives (optimal intervention into
anthropogenic forcing of the climate system and maintaining positive economic growth
worldwide) with only one policy tool (climate policy).
1See Persky (2001) for a further discussion of cost-benefit analysis, particularly the strict utilitarian welfare
assumptions. Equity and cost-benefit analysis in the context of climate change are discussed, amongst others,
by Kavuncu and Knabb (2005; see also Gerlagh 2006) and Tol (2002a).
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In this short paper, we test this hypothesis by including an economic aid feedback
mechanism that would be triggered by catastrophic climate impacts and thus insure that the
variance of marginal damages is finite. Before we describe some of the details of the
numerical modelling environment in Section 3 (it has evolved since 2003), we offer a brief
sketch of its conceptual framework in Section 2. Section 4 subsequently records the results of
a Monte Carlo analysis of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide, and Section 5 offers
some concluding remarks. The bottom line is qualified support for Yohe’s (2003) hypothesis.
2 The analytical context
For the sake of constructing the simplest context within which to explore the sources of the
philosopher-queen’s possible conundrum, assume that that per capita income y in country c
follows a growth path of the form
yc;t ¼ 1þ gc;t  f Dc;tYc;t
 
þ h Ac;t
Yc;t
  
yc;t1 ð1Þ
where D is the damage of climate change, Y is GDP, A is the aid received, and g is the
growth rate in absence of climate change and international aid; the subscripts c and t index
specific countries and specific time periods, respectively. The function f relates the
(negative) impacts of climate change (as a fraction of GDP) on economic growth; it is
described in some detail Fankhauser and Tol (2005). For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that climate damages are generally thought to be larger, as a percentage of GDP, in
poorer countries than rich ones (because adaptive capacity is lower, health care is worse, the
proportion of GDP related to the agriculture sector is larger, etc.). Meanwhile, the function
h relates the (positive) effects of international aid on economic growth; Easterly (2002)
offers a summary of the literature supporting its inclusion in Eq. 1. Finally, let f(0)=h(0)=0.
If we also assume that our philosopher-queen is a Benthamite utilitarian (Fankhauser et al.
1997), then marginal damage cost MD of carbon dioxide emissions at time s is the discounted
sum of contemporaneous marginal damages from period s forward. Notationally,
MDs ¼
X1
t¼s
XC
c¼1
Rc;s;tDEs;c;t
eytyc;t
 η
ð2Þ
where DE is the contemporaneous marginal damage
DEs;c;t ¼
@Dc;t
@Es
ð3Þ
and ey is the average per capita income in the world. The parameter η is the consumption
elasticity of marginal utility for a utility function of the form
Uc;t ¼
y1hc;t
1 h : ð4Þ
In the simulation work, though, we assume that η=1 so that
Uc;t ¼ ln yc;t
	 

: ð4aÞ
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The last term in Eq. 2 represents the equity weighting scheme designed to reflect
variation in the welfare value of the marginal dollar across different countries (rich and
poor). It is low less than one for rich countries whose per capita incomes are above the
global average, and it is above one for poor counties whose per capita incomes are below
the global average. Meanwhile, R is the discount factor; it takes the form
Rc;s;t ¼
Yt
r¼s
1þ rþ h gc;t  f Dc;t
	 
þ h Ac;t	 
  
1
ð5Þ
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference.
With this notation in hand, the mechanisms sketched in the introduction are clear. We
have already noted how a country with a low per capita income would have a high equity
weight in Eq. 2 unless η=0. Of course, monetary damages Dc in such a country would, in
absolute terms, be small over time; but we have already argued that f(D/Y) would then be
high. It follows that Eq. 5 identifies a second reason why the contribution of a poor country
with small absolute damages recorded directly into Eq. 2 could nonetheless be quite large.
Even small absolute damages can be a large fraction of GDP in a poor country; as a result,
small absolute damages in a poor country can make the denominator of the discount rate be
smaller than it would be otherwise and perhaps even drive it below one.
Other terms in the Ramsey discounting depicted in Eq. 5 could enlarge its contribution
even more by making it even more likely that the discounting denominator was less than
one. To see how, think about a country where climate impacts work to slow economic
growth; the denominator would shrink. If those impacts were so strong that growth turned
negative, though, then the discount rate could easily turn negative (at least absent economic
aid and especially if the pure rate of time preference imposed on intergenerational decisions
is small or perhaps even equal to zero).
Finally, the basis of our exploration of Yohe’s (2003) hypothesis can also be found in
Eq. 5; international aid, working through function h, is the only lever with which the
philosopher-queen could fight these effects. Tol (2003) did not allow international aid, so
A=0 throughout that earlier analysis. Here, we allow A>0 so that, in principle, we have a
mechanism to offset the negative impact of climate change on growth.
In the analysis described throughout this paper, we assume a fixed savings’ rate. That is,
g is independent of f(D/Y) in Eq. 1. Relaxing this assumption would provide an additional
mechanism to avoid the negative impacts of climate change on economic growth, but we
will show below that international aid may be sufficient and that is enough to make our
point. Besides, if confronted with inevitable economic collapse in the future, people may
decide to increase consumption rather than investment, and this tendency would be greater
if it would trigger international aid. Adding an international capital market to the modelling
exercise would further complicate the analysis. Foreign direct investment may well reduce
the probability of economic collapse in the face of severe climate impacts, but it is not
difficult to tell a story in which capital flight from those severe impacts would accelerate an
economic decline. Including either of these complications would require major changes to
the model that we employed, and so they are postponed (without undermining our two
objective – two policy exploration) to future research.
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3 The model
This paper uses version 2.8 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.8 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and
applied by Tol (1999, 2001, 2002a), except for the impact module, which is described by
Tol (2002b,c) and updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further difference is that the current
version of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. Finally, the model considers
emission reduction of methane and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described by
Tol (2006a). A full list of papers, the source code and the technical documentation for the
model can be found online at http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html. Readers
familiar with FUND can skip to Section 4 without loosing any continuity in our argument.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of 1 year.
The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In
FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to depend on the impact of the previous
year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial
values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical and
monetized impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of
the model runs. The twenty-second and twenty-third centuries are included to account for
the fact that key impacts of a weakening or a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation
would be disregarded if the time horizon of the simulations were shorter. Previous versions
of the model stopped at 2200.
The period of 1950–1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994). The period 1990–2000 is based on
observations (WRI 2000). The climate scenarios for the period 2010–2100 are based on the
EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett
et al. 1992). The 2000–2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past, and the period
2100–2300 extrapolated. The economic scenario is in market exchange rates (see Nordhaus
2007; Tol 2006b).
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth,
autonomous energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the
energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide
from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and
population growth are perturbed by the impact of climatic change. Population decreases
with increasing climate change related deaths that result from changes in heat stress, cold
stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an effect
only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality
also affect the number of births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of
the urban population among the total population is based on the World Resources Databases
(WRI 2000). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and
per-capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-
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induced migration between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to
change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the
respective host population.
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change
reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the
short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The
energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply
autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement policies,
an option not considered in this paper.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon
dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the
damages to the economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous
oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by
the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from
Hammitt et al. (1992). The model also contains sulphur emissions (Tol 2006a).
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is
determined based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-
life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C
for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from
multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial
climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al. 2000). The global mean
sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a
half-life of 50 years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best
guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002b,c) includes the following categories:
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold
and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption,
water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related damages can be
attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/year) or the level of change
(benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade,
reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol 2002c).
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they
can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are
monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income.
The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in
the literature (cf. Cline 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita
income (Tol 1995, 1996), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income
in the host region (Cline 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are
modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was
on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser 1994). Dryland value is
assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2
million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser 1994). The
wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection
is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the
construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze.
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Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, are
directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in
their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol 2002b). Impacts of climate change on energy consumption,
agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a
climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology
and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the
actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts
are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the optimum climate. The
optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts
lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not
being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol 2002c).
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple
power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign (cf.
Tol 2002c).
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as
water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and
ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to
become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress),
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved
health care) (cf. Tol 2002c).
4 Results
FUND was exercised to explore the distributions of marginal damages with and without an
aid policy that would transfer up to 1 or 2% of the combined GDP of the OECD as
necessary to sustain economic activity in regions who experience the unlikely event that
climate impacts would otherwise drive them to subsistence levels (i.e., the marginal damage
of climate change would become unbounded for these regions). Such transfers are triggered
as soon as per capita income starts to fall in any region that is currently not in the OECD,
and OECD regions are assumed to contribute to the transfers proportional to their GDP.
These transfers are assumed to exactly offset the income fall, unless the total transfers
exceed 1 (or 2%) of the total GDP of the OECD regions. It is important to note, for context,
that OECD countries aim to give 0.7% of their GDP in official development aid; of course,
few countries actually meet this target.
Two different regional weighting schemes in the global objective function were also
considered. In the first, individuals’ utilities around the world were simply summed in the
calculation of a Benthamite metric of global welfare. In the second, individuals’ utilities
were assigned “equity weights” according to Fankhauser et al. (1997). In all cases, though,
regional utilities were discounted according to the Ramsey rule given globally consistent
pure rates of time preference but regionally specific and endogenously determined rates of
growth in per-capita consumption. Slow or negative growth rates caused by particularly
pernicious climate change could therefore receive abnormally high weights in the global
policy analysis.
Table 1 displays results drawn from Monte Carlo analyses of 50,000 runs with and
without aid. The assumptions on the probability density functions of the parameters can be
found at http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html. The various panels of the table
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reflect characteristics of the distribution of the marginal damage of carbon emissions (in
dollars per tonne of carbon) across the runs for three different specifications of the pure rate
of time preference and two different utility weighting schemes. Notice that adding aid to the
policy calculus always lowers the mean and median estimate of marginal damage as well as
its variance. These reductions are, though, always larger for the equity weighting cases and
for cases in which the social discount rate is diminished by smaller pure rates of time
preference. Indeed, the reductions can be several orders of magnitude in those cases.
Moreover, while increased aid always reduces the variance (reflected by standard deviation
in Table 1) of marginal damages, it need not reduce the mean (or the median) for low
discount rates even for the equity weighting calculations.
These trends are easily explained in terms of the relative importance associated with the
occasional regionally catastrophic scenario in the expected value calculation. Equity
weights accentuate these cases in this calculation, and so the expected value calculus
assigns significant value to economic aid that can work to reduce the severe harm caused by
carbon emissions, which bring countries close to their critical margins. By way of contrast,
the expected value calculus also assigns ordinary (more modest) value to economic aid that
can work to reduce the modest harm caused by carbon emissions elsewhere. Low discount
rates (i.e., those associated with low pure rates of time preference) operate in the same way
but without regard to geographic differentiation, and so their effect is smaller. Specifically,
lower pure rates of time preference expand the weight given to damage in the distant future
when regional catastrophes may occur. Higher rates, of course, do the opposite. Finally, the
Table 1 Characteristics of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of
carbon) without and with aid (capped at 1 or 2% of OECD income) in a Monte Carlo analysis with 50,000
runs
Pure rate of time preference: 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 3%
Simple
sum
Equity
weights
Simple
sum
Equity
weights
Simple
sum
Equity
weights
No aid Mean 226.6 12,523.4 36.7 790.0 1.3 8.9
St. dev. 3,001.8 313,576.8 199.3 17,444.4 20.8 75.9
Percentiles: 1% −214.2 −366.7 −41.8 −47.2 −21.8 −29.3
5% −58.1 −53.2 −27.8 −29.9 −16.8 −22.0
50% 56.1 112.1 8.5 21.4 −4.0 −2.7
95% 732.7 11,464.3 180.4 928.5 37.0 69.8
99% 2,374.0 185,468.5 403.6 12,077.3 88.5 191.3
Aid, 1% max Mean 94.8 192.5 28.1 48.3 1.2 5.4
St. dev. 8,296.6 15,733.7 510.0 958.6 20.7 32.3
Percentiles: 1% −277.0 −302.8 −42.2 −45.8 −21.8 −29.4
5% −61.0 −52.4 −27.9 −29.7 −16.8 −22.0
50% 53.0 99.6 8.1 19.4 −4.0 −2.8
95% 551.9 978.4 163.8 239.9 36.7 59.9
99% 1,259.5 2,639.9 317.0 489.1 87.7 137.8
Aid, 2% max Mean 129.8 254.6 30.2 52.0 1.2 5.4
St. dev. 914.5 1,466.5 89.1 136.9 20.6 32.1
Percentiles: 1% −280.6 −303.4 −42.2 −45.8 −21.8 −29.4
5% −61.1 −52.2 −27.9 −29.7 −16.8 −22.0
50% 52.9 99.6 8.1 19.4 −4.0 −2.8
95% 548.1 968.5 163.5 239.8 36.7 59.9
99% 1,247.3 2,486.4 315.9 482.1 87.7 137.7
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effect of increasing aid from 1 to 2% can be explained in terms of the overall economic
productivity of the transfer. The reduction in global economic growth associated over time
with the second 1% increment does not reduce climate damage as effectively as the first
1%, and this lost power counts more heavily for smaller discount rates. Besides, more aid
would sustain a vulnerable economy, increasing aggregate damages.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 offers some insight into why the variance of marginal damages does
not necessarily converge as more runs are added to the analysis, though the problem is more
severe for equity weighting (Figs. 1 and 2). The sudden peaks that appear along the “No
Aid” and “Aid, 1%” schedules in Figs. 1 and 3 indicate the occurrence of scenarios for
which high marginal damages are felt in some region of the world. Figure 1, for example,
shows that a run just before the 15,000th for the “Aid 1%” simulations and another just
before the 40,000th run for the “No Aid” simulations cause such a peak given a 1% pure
rate of time. Interestingly, Fig. 1 shows that allowing aid to climb to 2% of GDP in the
OECD countries eliminates the importance of both peaks; moreover, aid from the OECD
limited to 1% of GDP seems to eliminate the significance of the second and higher peak.
These regionally confined economic catastrophes are rare events in the Monte Carlo
simulations, but their occurrence in a poor but populated region gives them high weight in
the expected value calculus from which estimates of marginal damages emerge when aid
cannot fully compensate and/or when the pure rate of time preference is low. Indeed, a little
bit of aid can bring a region back from the brink of catastrophe (and nearly unbounded
marginal damages) without moving the region away from the region of high and steeply
rising damages. In these cases, significant amounts of aid are required to reduce significantly
the distribution of marginal damages. It was to be expected, therefore, that the variance would
converge more robustly for the high-aid and/or high discount rate scenarios. Notice in Fig. 2,
in fact, that the differences are muted by the higher discount rate associated with a pure rate
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Fig. 1 The standard deviation of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions with and without
aid as a function of the number of Monte Carlo runs for a 1% pure rate of time preference; impacts are
equity-weighted; annual aid is limited to 1 or 2% of OECD GDP. The “No Aid” estimates are measured
against the left-hand vertical axis; the 1 and 2% Aid cases are calibrated by the right-hand vertical axis
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of time preference of 3%. In fact, aid eliminates both peaks for the high discount rate even
with equity weighting, even if aid is limited to 1% of OECD income.
Figure 3 shows that, without equity weighing, aid may increase the variance. This is
because, without equity weighing, the climate change impact on a collapsed economy
would hardly count; a little aid would sustain such an economy and increase the absolute
impacts it suffers. Figure 3 also shows that, if aid were higher, impacts would be lower; this
is because a more robust economy would be less vulnerable to climate change.
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Fig. 2 The standard deviation of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions with and without
aid as a function of the number of Monte Carlo runs for a 3% pure rate of time preference; impacts are
equity-weighted; annual aid is limited to 1 or 2% of OECD GDP
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Fig. 3 The standard deviation of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions with and without
aid as a function of the number of Monte Carlo runs for a 1% pure rate of time preference; impacts are not
equity-weighted; annual aid is limited to 1 or 2% of OECD GDP
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Figure 4 offers a different view of the results. There, the effects of aid are expressed as
the difference in per-capita income between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa
(chosen to typify a high and a low income region, respectively). Notice that aid, even at a
maximum of 2% of OECD GDP, has hardly any effect on the overall probability density of
per capita income in 2100.
Figure 5 shows the probability density function of the difference in per capita income for
the same two regions. Aid affects United States income in only 1.01% of the cases and
African income in only 0.19% of the cases. This confirms the message from Fig. 4. The
USA is more often affected than is Sub-Saharan Africa because other poor regions may face
climate-change-induced economic collapse as well. In the 50,000 Monte Carlo runs, aid
never reduces US income in 2100 by more than 10%; in this scenario, annual aid is capped
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Fig. 4 Probability density function of the 2100 per capita income without aid and with (capped at 2% of
OECD GDP) in the USA (top panel) and in Africa (bottom panel). Note that the lines overlap, that is, aid
hardly affects the probability density function of per capita income
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at 2% of GDP, but there are economic growth effects as well. On the other hand, per capita
income in Sub-Saharan Africa can be up to 60% higher due to aid; in most cases, however,
income is boosted by less than 30%.
5 Discussion and conclusion
It would appear that the hypothesis about adding a second policy lever to the climate policy
calculus holds, but not as robustly as one might have thought initially. The vagaries of
growth discounting, compounded here by equity weighting in the global welfare
calculations, are always difficult to predict. Nonetheless, adding aid to the policy portfolio
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Fig. 5 Probability density function of the difference in the 2100 per capita income due to aid (capped at 2%
of OECD GDP), expressed as a percentage of the same income without aid, for the USA (top panel) and
Africa (bottom panel)
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does reduce expected marginal damages associated with climate change, sometimes by
orders of magnitude (for equity weighting and low pure rates of time preference). Aid also
reduces the variance of marginal damages, again by orders of magnitude in some cases.
These improvements can, though, be muted by high discount rates derived from high pure
rates of time preference. Of course, the problem of large, maybe infinite variances is much
less pronounced when discount rates are high. It is also possible to “do too much aid,”
particularly with a low discount rate and no equity weighting; but this is an unlikely
combination. In short, a portfolio of international policies with at least two independent
tools can avoid infinite uncertainty on the margins and the associated implications for
global mitigation policy at a reasonable price even in the relatively unlikely event that
climate change causes negative economic growth in a region or two.
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